Security best practices

There are several anti-patterns and potential attack vectors that smart contract developers should be aware of. These can affect the security, efficiency, and correctness of the contracts. Below are some common pitfalls and best practices to avoid them.

Signed/unsigned integer vulnerabilities

Improper handling of signed integers can allow attackers to exploit overflow/underflow conditions.

Vulnerable code

(cell,()) transfer_voting_power(cell votes, slice from, slice to, int amount) impure {
    int from_votes = get_voting_power(votes, from);
    int to_votes = get_voting_power(votes, to);
    
    from_votes -= amount;  // Can become negative!
    to_votes += amount;
    
    votes~set_voting_power(from, from_votes);
    votes~set_voting_power(to, to_votes);
    return (votes,());
}

Secure implementation

(cell,()) transfer_voting_power(cell votes, slice from, slice to, int amount) impure {
    int from_votes = get_voting_power(votes, from);
    int to_votes = get_voting_power(votes, to);
    
    throw_unless(998, from_votes >= amount);  // Validate sufficient balance
    
    from_votes -= amount;
    to_votes += amount;
    
    votes~set_voting_power(from, from_votes);
    votes~set_voting_power(to, to_votes);
    return (votes,());
}

Sending sensitive data on-chain

The entire smart contract computation is transparent; confidential runtime values can be retrieved through emulation.

Vulnerable code

;; DON'T: Storing password hash or private data
cell private_data = begin_cell()
    .store_slice("secret_password_hash")
    .store_uint(user_private_key, 256)
    .end_cell();

Account destruction race conditions

Destroying accounts using send mode 128 + 32 without proper checks can lead to fund loss in race conditions.

Vulnerable code

() recv_internal(msg_value, in_msg_full, in_msg_body) {
    if (in_msg_body.slice_empty?()) {
        return ();  ;; Dangerous: empty message handling
    }
    
    ;; Process and destroy account
    send_raw_message(msg, 128 + 32);  ;; Destroys account
}

Secure approach

() recv_internal(msg_value, in_msg_full, in_msg_body) {
    ;; Proper validation before any destruction
    throw_unless(error::unauthorized, authorized_sender?(sender));
    
    ;; Ensure no pending operations
    throw_unless(error::pending_operations, safe_to_destroy?());
    
    ;; Then proceed with destruction if really needed
}

Missing replay protection

Replay protection is a security mechanism that prevents an attacker from reusing a previous message. External messages without replay protection can be re-executed multiple times by an attacker which could lead to fund loss or other undesired behavior.

Secure implementation

() recv_external(slice in_msg) impure {
    slice ds = get_data().begin_parse();
    int stored_seqno = ds~load_uint(32);
    int msg_seqno = in_msg~load_uint(32);
    
    throw_unless(33, msg_seqno == stored_seqno);  ;; Prevent replay
    
    accept_message();
    
    ;; Update sequence number
    set_data(begin_cell().store_uint(stored_seqno + 1, 32).end_cell());
}

Unconditional accepting of external messages

Incoming external messages do not transfer funds. Receiving smart contract must pay for their processing from its balance. Upon receiving an external message, a smart contract can spend some free gas (gas_credit) in order to decide whether it is ready to accept it, and then pay for its further processing. External messages are usually accepted through the ACCEPT TVM instruction, which sets gas_limit to its maximum possible value specified in the network configuration, and sets gas_credit to zero. From this point on, the contract will have to pay for the entire processing of the incoming message. Therefore, if ACCEPT is not guarded by a condition, an attacker might repeatedly send messages, and spend the entire balance of the contract. The SETGASLIMIT instruction can lead to the same issue.

Vulnerable code

() recv_external(slice in_msg) {
    accept_message();
    ;; ...
}

Secure implementation

Checks before accepting an external message vary by use case. The following example is a part of wallet v3 code, that doesn’t accept a message if it isn’t signed by the wallet’s owner.

() recv_external(slice in_msg) impure {
    ;; parse message and contract storage (omitted)
    throw_unless(33, msg_seqno == stored_seqno);
    throw_unless(34, subwallet_id == stored_subwallet);
    throw_unless(35, check_signature(slice_hash(in_msg), signature, public_key));
    accept_message();
    ;; handle the message (omitted)
}

Invalid throw values

Exit codes 0 and 1 indicate normal execution of the compute phase of the transaction. Execution can be unexpectedly aborted by calling a throw directly with exit codes 0 and 1. This can make debugging very difficult since such aborted execution would be indistinguishable from a normal one.

Gas limitation

Be careful with the Out of gas error. It cannot be handled, so try to pre-calculate the gas consumption whenever possible. This will help avoid wasting extra gas, as the transaction will fail anyway.

Secure implementation

message Vote { votes: Int as int32 }

contract VoteCounter() {
    const voteGasUsage = 10000; // precompute with tests

    receive(msg: Vote) {
        require(context().value > getComputeFee(self.voteGasUsage, false), "Not enough gas!");
        // ...subsequent logic...
    }

    // Empty receiver for the deployment,
    // which forwards the remaining value back to the sender
    receive() { cashback(sender()) }
}

Insecure random numbers

Generating truly secure random numbers in TON is challenging. The built-in random functions are pseudo-random and depend on logical time. An attacker can predict the randomized number by brute-forcing the logical time in the current block.

Secure approach

For critical applications, avoid relying solely on on-chain solutions.
Use built-in random functions with randomized logical time to enhance security by making predictions harder for attackers without access to a validator node. Note, however, that it is still not entirely foolproof.
Consider using the commit-and-disclose scheme:

Participants generate random numbers off-chain and send their hashes to the contract.
Once all hashes are received, participants disclose their original numbers.
Combine the disclosed numbers (e.g., summing them) to produce a secure random value.

Don’t use randomization in external message receivers, as it remains vulnerable even with randomized logical time.

Executing third-party code

Executing untrusted code can compromise contract security.

Prevention

;; Validate all external code before execution
throw_unless(error::untrusted_code, verify_code_signature(code));
throw_unless(error::invalid_code, validate_code_safety(code));

Race condition of messages

A message cascade can be processed over many blocks. Assume that while one message flow is running, an attacker can initiate a second message flow in parallel. That is, if a property was checked at the beginning, such as whether the user has enough tokens, do not assume that it will still be satisfied at the third stage in the same contract.

Preventing front-running with signature verification

In TON blockchain, all pending messages are publicly visible in the mempool. Front-running can occur when an attacker observes a pending transaction containing a valid signature and quickly submits their own transaction using the same signature before the original transaction is processed.

Secure approach

Include critical parameters like the recipient address (to) within the data that is signed. This ensures that the signature is valid only for the intended operation and recipient, preventing attackers from reusing the signature for their benefit. Also, implement replay protection to prevent the same signed message from being used multiple times.

struct RequestBody {
    to: Address;
    seqno: Int as uint64;
}

message(0x988d4037) Request {
    signature: Slice as bytes64;
    requestBody: RequestBody;
}

contract SecureChecker(
    publicKey: Int as uint256,
    seqno: Int as uint64, // Add seqno for replay protection
) {
    receive(request: Request) {
        // Verify the signature against the reconstructed data hash
        require(checkSignature(request.requestBody.toCell().hash(), request.signature, self.publicKey), "Invalid signature!");

        // Check replay protection
        require(request.requestBody.seqno == self.seqno, "Invalid seqno"); // Assuming external message with seqno
        self.seqno += 1; // Increment seqno after successful processing

        // Ensure the message is sent to the address specified in the signed data
        message(MessageParameters {
            to: request.requestBody.to, // Use the 'to' from the signed request
            value: 0,
            mode: SendRemainingBalance, // Caution: sending the whole balance!
            bounce: false,
            body: "Your action payload here".asComment(), // Example body
        });
    }

    // Empty receiver for the deployment,
    // which forwards the remaining value back to the sender
    receive() { cashback(sender()) }

    get fun seqno(): Int {
        return self.seqno;
    }
}

Remember to also implement replay protection to prevent reusing the same signature even if it’s correctly targeted.

Vulnerable approach

Do not sign data without including essential context like the recipient address. An attacker could intercept the message, copy the signature, and replace the recipient address in their own transaction, effectively redirecting the intended action or funds.

message(0x988d4037) Request {
    signature: Slice as bytes64;
    data: Slice as remaining; // 'to' address is not part of the signed data
}

contract InsecureChecker(
    publicKey: Int as uint256,
) {
    receive(request: Request) {
        // The signature only verifies 'request.data', not the intended recipient.
        if (checkDataSignature(request.data.hash(), request.signature, self.publicKey)) {
            // Attacker can see this message, copy the signature, and send their own
            // message to a different 'to' address before this one confirms.
            // The 'sender()' here is the original sender, but the attacker can initiate
            // a similar transaction targeting themselves or another address.
            message(MessageParameters {
                to: sender(), // Vulnerable: recipient isn't verified by the signature
                value: 0,
                mode: SendRemainingBalance, // Caution: sending the whole balance!
                bounce: false,
            });
        }
    }

    // Empty receiver for the deployment,
    // which forwards the remaining value back to the sender
    receive() { cashback(sender()) }
}

Furthermore, once a signature is used in a transaction, it becomes publicly visible on the blockchain. Without proper replay protection, anyone can potentially reuse this signature and the associated data in a new transaction if the contract logic doesn’t prevent it.

Return gas excesses carefully

If excess gas is not returned to the sender, funds accumulate in contracts over time. This is suboptimal. Add a function to rake out excess, but popular contracts like Jetton wallet return it to the sender with a message using the 0xd53276db opcode.

Secure gas handling

message(0xd53276db) Excesses {}
message Vote { votes: Int as int32 }

contract Sample(
    votes: Int as uint32,
) {
    receive(msg: Vote) {
        self.votes += msg.votes;

        message(MessageParameters {
            to: sender(),
            value: 0,
            mode: SendRemainingValue | SendIgnoreErrors,
            body: Excesses {}.toCell(),
        });
    }

    // Empty receiver for the deployment,
    // which forwards the remaining value back to the sender
    receive() { cashback(sender()) }
}

Pulling data from another contract

Contracts in the blockchain can reside in separate shards processed by another set of validators. This means that one contract cannot pull data from another contract. Specifically, no contract can call a getter function from another contract. Thus, any on-chain communication is asynchronous and done by sending and receiving messages.

Secure approach

Exchange messages to pull data from another contract.

message GetMoney {}
message ProvideMoney {}
message TakeMoney { money: Int as coins }

contract OneContract(
    money: Int as coins,
) {
    receive(msg: ProvideMoney) {
        message(MessageParameters {
            to: sender(),
            value: 0,
            mode: SendRemainingValue | SendIgnoreErrors,
            body: TakeMoney { money: self.money }.toCell(),
        });
    }

    // Empty receiver for the deployment,
    // which forwards the remaining value back to the sender
    receive() { cashback(sender()) }
}

contract AnotherContract(
    oneContractAddress: Address,
) {
    receive(_: GetMoney) {
        message(MessageParameters {
            to: self.oneContractAddress,
            value: 0,
            mode: SendRemainingValue | SendIgnoreErrors,
            bounce: false,
            body: ProvideMoney {}.toCell(),
        });
    }

    receive(msg: TakeMoney) {
        require(sender() == self.oneContractAddress, "Invalid money provider!");
        // ...further processing...
    }

    // Empty receiver for the deployment,
    // which forwards the remaining value back to the sender
    receive() { cashback(sender()) }
}

TON address representation issues

TON addresses have multiple formats that must be handled correctly.

Address formats

;; Raw: 0:b4c1b2ede12aa76f4a44353944258bcc8f99e9c7c474711a152c78b43218e296
;; Bounceable: EQC0wbLt4Sqnb0pENTlEJYvMj5npx8R0cRoVLHi0MhjilkPX
;; Non-bounceable: UQC0wbLt4Sqnb0pENTlEJYvMj5npx8R0cRoVLHi0Mhjilh4S

;; Always validate workchain
force_chain(to_address);

Name collision vulnerabilities

Function or variable names can collide with built-in functions or reserved keywords.

Best practice

;; Use descriptive, unique names
int user_balance = 0;  ;; Instead of just 'balance'
() validate_user_signature()  ;; Instead of just 'validate()'

Incorrect data type handling

Reading or writing incorrect data types can corrupt contract state.

Vulnerable code

;; Writing uint but reading int
storage~store_uint(value, 32);
int read_value = storage~load_int(32);  ;; Type mismatch

Secure implementation

;; Consistent type usage
storage~store_uint(value, 32);
int read_value = storage~load_uint(32);

Missing function return value checks

Ignoring function return values can lead to logic errors and unexpected behavior.

Vulnerable code:

dictinfos~udict_delete?(32, index);  ;; Ignoring success flag

Secure implementation:

int success = dictinfos~udict_delete?(32, index);
throw_unless(error::fail_to_delete_dict, success);

Contract code updates

Contracts can be updated if not properly protected, changing their behavior unexpectedly.

Secure implementation

() update_code(cell new_code) impure {
    throw_unless(error::unauthorized, authorized_admin?(sender()));
    throw_unless(error::invalid_code, validate_code?(new_code));
    
    set_code(new_code);
}

Ecosystem

Payment processing

Standard contracts

Contract development

Languages

TVM: TON Virtual Machine

Blockchain foundations

Web3 services

Contribute

​Signed/unsigned integer vulnerabilities

​Vulnerable code

​Secure implementation

​Sending sensitive data on-chain

​Vulnerable code

​Account destruction race conditions

​Vulnerable code

​Secure approach

​Missing replay protection

​Secure implementation

​Unconditional accepting of external messages

​Vulnerable code

​Secure implementation

​Invalid throw values

​Gas limitation

​Secure implementation

​Insecure random numbers

​Secure approach

​Executing third-party code

​Prevention

​Race condition of messages

​Preventing front-running with signature verification

​Secure approach

​Vulnerable approach

​Return gas excesses carefully

​Secure gas handling

​Pulling data from another contract

​Secure approach

​TON address representation issues

​Address formats

​Name collision vulnerabilities

​Best practice

​Incorrect data type handling

​Vulnerable code

​Secure implementation

​Missing function return value checks

​Vulnerable code:

​Secure implementation:

​Contract code updates

​Secure implementation

Signed/unsigned integer vulnerabilities

Vulnerable code

Secure implementation

Sending sensitive data on-chain

Vulnerable code

Account destruction race conditions

Vulnerable code

Secure approach

Missing replay protection

Secure implementation

Unconditional accepting of external messages

Vulnerable code

Secure implementation

Invalid throw values

Gas limitation

Secure implementation

Insecure random numbers

Secure approach

Executing third-party code

Prevention

Race condition of messages

Preventing front-running with signature verification

Secure approach

Vulnerable approach

Return gas excesses carefully

Secure gas handling

Pulling data from another contract

Secure approach

TON address representation issues

Address formats

Name collision vulnerabilities

Best practice

Incorrect data type handling

Vulnerable code

Secure implementation

Missing function return value checks

Vulnerable code:

Secure implementation:

Contract code updates

Secure implementation